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Doubt, suspicion, and mistrust are closely related concepts. Consider the following sentence: 
In the absence of trust, people approach an object with suspicion, and are likely to cast doubt 
on any information emanating from it. The ease with which these concepts can be 
meaningfully placed in a single sentence is suggestive of the overlap between them. But 
reordering the sentence causes complications. It cannot start with doubt because to be 
doubtful does not necessarily imply being suspicious or mistrusting. That is, while suspicion 
and mistrust refer to negatively charged dispositions, this is not always the case with doubt.  
Moreover, suspicion needs to stay in the middle because its focused directionality makes it a 
sort of connector between the other two concepts. Suspicion denotes a direct and active 
engagement with an object, and, although mistrust and doubt also imply engagement, mistrust 
can equally refer to a latent disposition, while doubt can also be used to refer to largely 
internal processes of the mind.  
Before elaborating on the differences between these concepts, it is important to ask what it is 
that they hold in common.  Doubt, suspicion, and mistrust refer to a tension between a subject 
and that which is doubted, suspected, mistrusted. I say tension rather than rupture because the 
mistrustful, suspicious, or doubtful relationship has substance, which can be productive or 
destructive. Moreover, they are relative in the sense that radical doubt and radical mistrust are 
untenable. In addition to this, assertions of mistrust and doubt at one level tend to assert trust 
and certainty at different levels, even if only implicitly. Finally, while each term implies an 
epistemic crisis, this entails more than the logical operations of falsification, verification, and 
probability attribution. The crisis extends to the intention and integrity that underpin the 
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epistemic assertions.  In other words, mistrust, suspicion, and doubt entail not a detached but 
an affective position towards knowledge, carrying evaluative (aesthetic, moral, political) 
dimensions.   
The point of highlighting these commonalities is to establish a comparative framework within 
which to make sense of the differences. Tension, relativity, and affect are manifested 
differently and with different consequences in the cases of doubt, mistrust and suspicion. This 
is what the next three sections set out to explore, in reverse order. Let me be clear that the 
point of these semantic reflections is not so much to gain terminological clarity (although 
there is nothing wrong with that) but rather to highlight important aspects of human practice 
that are addressed through these terms. Such attention is warranted because these aspects have 
received insufficient analytic attention (see Mühlfried, introduction to this volume). It is also 
of particular relevance given that political mobilization in the contemporary world seems to 
be based less on hope and idealism than on mistrust and fear. In order to connect the semantic 
explorations to current political processes I will use vignettes from the 2016 U.S. elections, 
starting the next two sections with quotes taken from a July 2016 episode of the Daily Show, 
a popular American political comedy show. Here we follow reporter Jessica Williams who 
interviews a small group of voters who had initially supported the Democrat Bernie Sanders, 
but shifted their support to Donald Trump when Hillary Clinton clinched the nomination of 
the Democratic Party.
1
 The Daily Show obviously selected and presented responses of 
supporters for comic effect, choosing those with particularly stark features. While this 
comical bias should be kept in mind, the responses do still offer good starting points for an 
analytic discussion of how doubt, suspicion, and mistrust work in contemporary political 
processes.  
 
                                                 
1 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwfM5LGMmxg  
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Affective Knowledge 
Hillary Clinton has been a scam artist all her life. She will bring us to war within the first ninety 
days ... Hillary Clinton is just a stack of garbage . . . She disgusts me  
Sanders-turned-Trump supporter, Daily Show, 30 June 2016. 
 
Mistrust, doubt, and suspicion denote an epistemic crisis of sorts, one in which appearances, 
assumptions and assertions are being interrogated. With regards to doubt, philosophers have 
often employed this feature in their metaphysical contemplations. Descartes famously 
depicted himself as a ‘being that doubts’ and set himself the task of systematically discarding 
all opinions and preconceptions, because this would enable him to build from a solid and 
unquestionable foundation a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences (1996: 12-15). 
While such systematic doubt has obvious value in scholarly work, it is important to point out 
that ‘lived doubt’ is usually less deliberate and systematic, and as a result has very different 
qualities. As some critics have pointed out, the doubt Descartes advocated was ‘staged doubt’ 
(Skirry 2005) and, therefore, offers us little insight into the doubting subject and their 
engagement with the objects of their doubt. Peirce captured the central problem when 
rebuking this staging of doubt: ‘Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not 
doubt in our hearts’ (Peirce 1868: 141).  
That is to say, in discussions of lived reality the ‘epistemic crisis’ that is connoted through 
terms such as doubt, suspicion, and mistrust is not only a logical one, but an affective one as 
well. The challenge therefore is to examine the various ways in which thought and feeling 
come together in such epistemic crises. Looking at the everyday use of the terms under 
review, it is clear that doubt is associated with a wide range of affective states. Doubt can 
refer to a sense of curious wonder about, say, the existence of an afterlife; it can also refer to 
the teasing assertion ‘I really doubt that,’ such as in response to a truth-statement by a know-
it-all-friend. It can also refer to the to worrying or even desperate thoughts that emerge in 
situations of intense uncertainty (such as after a betrayal or conflict) about what to believe, 
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whom to trust, and what to do next. The person who doubts is never indifferent, but actively 
engages with alternatives: he or she is of ‘two minds’, as the number two in the German 
Zweifel and the French douter already suggest (see Pelkmans 2013: 4). 
The affective dimension is even more conspicuously present in the cases of suspicion and 
mistrust. Here, it is not so much engagement with ‘alternatives’ that creates the tension, but 
rather the negative perception of the institution or person that stands behind a statement or 
publicly available information. In other words, as soon as Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, 
Nigel Farage, or other right-wing populists open their mouths, I personally have an immediate 
negative gut feeling that their words need to be treated with suspicion. And as the opening 
quotation from the Daily Show suggests, many American voters experienced similar negative 
feelings when they heard Hillary Clinton speak. Here, mistrust for Hillary Clinton, for the 
government, or for the Democratic Party, complicated their epistemic engagement with 
information. Whatever Clinton said was filtered through aesthetic registers (a ‘stack of 
garbage’) and through a moral prism (a ‘scam artist’). In this highly polarised environment, 
statements or claims emanating from ‘the other side’ were immediately treated as a front for 
some deeper truth.  
Tying these reflections together, several overarching questions concerning the relationship 
between subjects and knowledge can be formulated. Crucially, we need to ask how epistemic 
dispositions and probes are amplified, modified, and tempered by the affective ties between 
actors. We also must consider what stands behind the statements and the available 
information. Moreover, we need to think about how these affective-epistemic engagements 
emerge from and have an effect on larger socio-political landscapes. 
 
Relative Positioning 
[Trump] has diarrhoea of the mouth, but he will say what many people think ... he is a bigot and a 
racist, however . . . Hillary Clinton has been a scam artist all her life  
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Sanders-turned-Trump supporter, Daily Show, 30 June 2016. 
 
The word ‘however’ in the quotation above forms the crux of what this section tries to 
convey. The Sanders-turned-Trump supporters were clearly not enthusiastic about Donald 
Trump’s oral diarrhoea and his bigoted and racist persona. But they were ready to suspend 
their reservations, and view as positive that ‘he will say what many people think.’ Their 
willingness to do so is captured by the ‘however’, which suggests that their greater mistrust 
and suspicion of Clinton pushed them to be more accepting of the disliked but not mistrusted 
Trump. To be mistrustful of everything and everyone is untenable, or as Mühlfried (this 
volume) points out, ‘radical forms of mistrust are difficult to live’. 
A comparison with the impossibility of radical doubt is valuable here. In his treatise On 
Certainty, Wittgenstein wrote: ‘If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the 
meaning of your words either. If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as 
doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’ (1969: 114-115). I 
support Wittgenstein’s point about the impossibility of radical doubt not only because of its 
logical significance, but also because it illuminates an important aspect of the manifestation of 
doubt in everyday life. This aspect has been empirically illustrated in several ethnographic 
explorations. In her work on gold mining in Mongolia, Mette High analysed how informally 
operating miners dealt with uncertainty and unpredictability. They conceptualised their 
misfortunes as part of a ‘destabilisation of the cosmos’ and were preoccupied with the role 
that spirits played in this disordering. While doubting the intentions and questioning the 
strength and actions of these spirits, the miners could not help but reaffirm their reality (High 
2013). A similar logic emanates from the doubts expressed by Old Believers living in the 
Danube delta as studied by Vlad Naumescu. These Old Believers despaired that they no 
longer had the knowledge to properly carry out rituals, but through their worries and doubts 
they ended up affirming the importance of leading a Christian life (Naumescu 2013). Doubt 
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denotes an active engagement with the world, and it is this engagement that affirms certainty 
about reality at other levels. 
In other words, what starts out as an epistemic crisis ends up as an epistemic affirmation. This 
dynamic is equally visible in the case of suspicion and mistrust. As Victor Vakhshtayn (2016) 
argued, there is a negative correlation between institutional and interpersonal mistrust. The 
point here is that when people are more mistrusting of the institutions of the state they are 
more likely to invest in interpersonal relations. Every mistrustful assertion needs to be hinged 
on a solid foundation.  Returning briefly to the quotation with which I started the section, 
mistrust of Hillary Clinton and ‘the establishment’ often led to a suspension of doubt with 
regard to the alternative, Donald Trump. Trust and mistrust, doubt and certainty, suspicion 
and acceptance, feed off of each other. In other words, the interrogatory focus not only leaves 
unseen and thus unchallenged what lies in the margins, but, moreover, its recoil effect 
strengthens those elements that were needed for launching the interrogation in the first place.  
What are the implications of these observations? Clearly, what we are observing is how 
people strive to create liveable situations, about how they navigate landscapes that are replete 
with unknowns and uncertainties, in which they focus their doubts and suspicions on certain 
objects, leaving issues that are less immediately problematic or threatening for what they are. 
The following questions are of vital interest: what forms of certainty are produced in the 
process of doubting? What relations of trust are intensified when people are mistrustful?  
What does generalised doubt and mistrust look like? 
 
Productive Tensions 
In politics and economics, prolonged reflection and contemplation is often seen negatively as 
a sign of indecisiveness. Contemporary political leaders therefore are unlikely to present 
themselves as doubters. This tempering or even obstructing effect of doubt is even 
acknowledged by those who refuse to dismiss its value. In his poem ‘In praise of Doubt’, 
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Bertold Brecht tellingly writes:  ‘the thoughtless who never doubt / Meet the thoughtful who 
never act’ (Brecht 1979: 334). On the other hand, doubt is also seen as the driver of quests for 
knowledge. It is only when things are no longer taken for granted—when doubts are raised—
that people reach out for knowledge, and in the process may end up finding new insights.
2
 
Moreover, commitment and conviction are not uncommonly the product of an active side-
lining of doubt. Examples of this are presented by studies of recent converts who fervently 
proclaim their newfound conviction, in part because of their greater need (and momentary 
ability) to suspend lingering doubt (Pelkmans 2013). It thus appears that doubt is a 
constitutive aspect of commitment and conviction. At the same time, its effects depend on 
how these doubts are acted on: powerful energies are released when doubts are dismissed (or 
side-lined) during a moment of intense wavering. On the other hand, when doubts are allowed 
to linger they tend to have a tempering effect or may even prevent any action from 
materializing.   
The emotive energies released by mistrust and suspicion suggest a somewhat different 
dynamic. Rather than the doubter’s ‘wavering’ that can go in either direction, mistrust and 
suspicion are already negatively predisposed towards the object of their engagement. It is 
because of this that suspicion and mistrust are seen as an eroding and disrupting force. 
Modern institutions cannot operate without some level of trust. It is on the basis of this that 
Anthony Giddens argues that ‘trust relations are basic to the extended time-space 
distanciation associated with modernity’ (1990: 87), and he rightly suggests that without trust, 
modern societies would grind to a halt. However, we have already concluded that generalised 
or radical mistrust is untenable, and hence this correct theoretical statement is unhelpful in a 
practical sense. Another way to put this is to say that in as far as mistrust denotes an active 
rather than a passive disposition, mistrust bespeaks a positive engagement with the world. As 
Rosanvallon (2008) has insightfully argued, it is problematic to speak of ‘disenchanted 
                                                 
2 In academia this doubting approach is institutionalised as ‘organised scepticism’, a term used by Merton in his 
discussion of the four norms of scientific communities (Merton 1973: 267-280). 
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citizens’ precisely because their rejection of mistrusted politicians and institutions results in 
the channelling of energies in alternative directions.  
A useful example of the alternative ways citizens express their political engagement is 
conspiracy theorizing, not least because it can serve as the basis for the creation of alternative 
political communities. We see this logic play out in the current political landscape of North 
America and Europe, where widespread mistrust of ‘the establishment’ has translated into an 
explosion of conspiracy theorizing that has invigorated numerous populist movements. A 
good example is speculation surrounding the role of the CIA in bringing about (or facilitating) 
the 9/11 attacks. These conspiracy theorising activities crystallized in the formation of the 
‘9/11 truth movement’, which became a platform for voicing concerns about the collusion of 
power and capital in the higher echelons of American society.
3
 Although some conspiracy 
theories are clearly extraordinary, many of the less spectacular but more realistic theories on 
display, such as those concerning secret deals between corporate business and politics, can 
potentially play a positive role in holding authorities accountable (see also Pelkmans and 
Machold 2011).  
While conspiracy theorizing that is informed by distrust of dominant power can serve as a 
‘counter democracy’ (Rosanvallon 2008: 9), when such mistrust merges with dominant (and 
racial) prejudices and stereotypes its effects tend to be more nefarious. This kind of 
conspiracy theorizing has been particularly prolific in right-wing corners, ranging from the 
insistence that climate change is a hoax to claims that Barack Obama was in cahoots with 
Jihadists.
4
 Irrespective of effect, in all of these instances mistrust of ‘the establishment’ was 
translated into conspiracy theorizing, a channelling of suspicion that has lent a voice to those 
who found themselves on the margins of political and economic processes. 
                                                 
3 Regarding the 9/11 conspiracies, see the various contributions to the website of the 9/11 truth movement 
(http://www.911truth.org) and the books of David Griffin (2007; 2012) about the possible collusions of power 
and capital in relation to these acts of terror. 





The concepts of mistrust and doubt allow us to engage analytically with a fractured and 
unstable world that is constantly changing. With economic forces becoming increasingly 
elusive, extensions of the state increasingly invisible, and the sources of news increasingly 
untraceable, our ‘modes of coping with the unfamiliar’ (Luhmann 2000: 102) are changing. 
For the moment this seems to play into the hands of those who are able to mobilise sentiments 
of mistrust and suspicion while promising a return to authentic power. The ‘anti-expert’ mood 
in the UK and the populist movements of the extreme right in Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands are examples of this trend. The rise of Donald Trump is particularly interesting 
(and worrying) in this regard. His election victory embodies the elevation of suspicion and 
mistrust to the highest levels of political power. Even before the 2016 elections Trump had 
become, as one commentator aptly put it, ‘conspiracy-theorist-in-chief.’
5
 His theories of voter 
fraud, his claims about Barrack Obama’s alleged foreign birth and his allegations of secret 
ties between Clinton and global business, much of which was offhandedly tweeted, played a 
significant role in his ability to mobilise anti-establishment sentiment.  
Writing in March 2017, two months after Trump assumed the presidency, it remains unclear 
what the ultimate outcome will be. Are we witnessing a movement from anti-establishment 
sentiment to a form of generalised mistrust and doubt, leading to chaos and uncertainty? Or, 
alternatively, are we seeing a shift from a situation in which suspicion and mistrust was 
projected onto the political establishment, to a situation in which suspicion and mistrust 
becomes a tool used by the new establishment to control, subject, and exclude? 
A truly disturbing prospect is that in its elevation to the apex of political power, mistrust will 
be redirected outwards by an increasingly self-confident political establishment. The first 
months of the Trump presidency provided signs that this might be the case. The travel ban of 
                                                 
5 Tim Murphy, “How Donald Trump Became Conspiracy Theorist in Chief,” Mother Jones, 4 October 2016, 
see: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/10/trump-infowars-alex-jones-clinton-conspiracy-theories 
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people from a limited number of Muslim-majority countries, and the tweets accusing foreign 
governments of hurting American interests suggested that mistrust was increasingly being 
projected outwards. In other words, suspicion and mistrust were increasingly used as defence 
mechanisms to shore up the powers of the establishment, in the process intensifying dynamics 
of gagging, marginalization and exclusion, perhaps with even worse still to come. However, 
this strategy has so far had limited effect because of considerable pushback from within 
various corners of American society, resulting for example in the collapse of the travel ban 
and an increasingly defensive White House. 
So what are some of the other possibilities? If Trump continues to spout unfounded 
conspiracy theories and express suspicion about the establishment that he himself is 
supposedly leading, then this may well result in the actual realization of a ‘post-truth era’, that 
is, a situation in which ‘truth’ truly becomes irrelevant. And there are serious indications that 
this is the direction into which events are headed, at least for now. Faced with significant 
disgruntlement within the electorate and opposition within state institutions, Trump and his 
associates have increasingly projected their frustrations onto the ‘deep state’, that is, voicing 
the (conspiracy) theory that career government employees are colluding to upset and oust the 
elected government. A government whose leaders are themselves deeply suspicious of the 
establishment that they represent may well lead to generalised paranoia and as such to the 
implosion of the system. Generalised mistrust prevents cooperation and radical doubt implies 
chaos, thereby fostering confusion and apathy.  
At this point it remains unclear which of the indicated tendencies will prevail. It is possible 
that the Trump government will overcome its first disappointments and develop into a regime 
that self-confidently projects its paranoia outwardly, with exclusionary and marginalizing 
effects for those groups that do not fit the political, economic, sexual, religious, and racial 
proclivities of the Trump government. It is against the background of this very real possibility 
that the prospect of chaos sounds desirable indeed. After all, the possible descent of the 
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Trump government into a destructive chaos may very well create the conditions that allow 
progressive political movements to capitalize on people’s disenchantment. Perhaps they 
would even be able to focus the disillusionment and the associated suspicions to address the 
tremendous convergence of political power and capital (such as is evident in the number of 
billionaires in Trump’s cabinet), and thereby to set a first step in the direction of badly needed 
real change.  
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